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BACK DOOR ARBITRATION:  WHY ALLOWING 
NONSIGNATORIES TO UNFAIRLY UTILIZE 
ARBITRATION CLAUSES MAY VIOLATE THE 
SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Nima H. Mohebbi* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1925, amidst prevalent judicial hostility toward arbitration, 
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).1  The FAA was 
enacted to address the existing judicial hostility2 by placing a premium on 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements,3 and expressing a federal policy 
favoring arbitration.4  This pro-arbitration policy has sometimes, however, 
trumped equitable, statutory, and even constitutional mandates. 
 
 * I would like to thank Joseph Profaizer for his invaluable guidance and astute 
suggestions on this topic.  Many thanks are also due to Craig Reiser for his comments 
throughout the writing process, and to Vianney Lopez and all of the editors at the Journal 
who worked on this article. 
 1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006) (originally enacted as the United States Arbitration Act, ch. 
213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)). 
 2. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 (1924) (noting judicial reluctance to enforce certain 
types of arbitration agreements). 
 3. See generally JON O. SHIMABUKURO, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: 
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for 
Congress Order Code RL30934, updated Aug. 15, 2003), available at 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-3879:1 (discussing the 
legislative history and subsequent judicial interpretation of the FAA). 
 4. See, e.g., Hall St. Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (“Congress 
enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy 
favoring [it] and plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.’” 
(citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006))); see also 
Frank Z. LaForge, Inequitable Estoppel:  Arbitrating with Nonsignatory Defendants Under 
Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEX. L. REV. 225, 228-29 (2005) (noting judicial resistance 
to enforcing arbitration agreements before and after the enactment of the FAA). 
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Recently, the Supreme Court decided the case of Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. Carlisle, holding that nonsignatories to arbitration agreements may 
appeal denials of motions to stay litigation under the FAA.5  In so holding, 
however, the Court has opened a potential floodgate by implicitly 
authorizing the common practice by which federal courts permit 
nonsignatories to take unfair advantage of arbitration clauses where they 
would not otherwise have a legitimate expectation to invoke such clauses.  
As an example of this latter phenomenon, various courts have permitted 
nonsignatories to compel plaintiffs to submit to binding arbitration under 
an application of equitable estoppel that does not require proving that the 
plaintiff unreasonably relied on an agreement containing a clause to 
arbitrate in asserting any claims.6  Moreover, this doctrine does not require 
the nonsignatory to prove equitable estoppel’s traditional elements of 
misrepresentation and detrimental reliance.7 
This application of equitable estoppel can be illustrated with a 
hypothetical example.  Envision a case involving a plaintiff8 who has 
suffered damages pursuant to a breached contract with one party (“Party 
A”), and assume that the contract contains an agreement to submit all 
claims arising from any breach between the parties to binding arbitration.  
Further assume that a third party (“Party B”), who was not a signatory to 
the arbitration agreement, is joined in the litigation and seeks a motion to 
compel the plaintiff to submit the claims against her to arbitration, or seeks 
to stay the already-initiated litigation so that an arbitration may take place.  
Party B reasons essentially that overlapping allegations of factually 
interdependent misconduct exist between the plaintiff’s claims against both 
Party A and Party B, and as such, the court should require the plaintiff to 
arbitrate his claims against Party B as well.  Obviously, the parties must 
arbitrate if Party B’s motion is granted.  If Party B’s motion is denied, 
however, Party B may appeal the denial.9  This article contends that 
allowing nonsignatories to invoke arbitration clauses under the latter 
application of equitable estoppel may violate the Seventh Amendment.10 
 
 5. 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009) (“Carlisle”). 
 6. See, e.g., infra Section III.B; cf. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 
2007) (holding that a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement could compel arbitration 
under the common law principle of equitable estoppel where claims with multiple 
defendants were “inextricably intertwined”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. This article will use the term “plaintiff” interchangeably with “signatory” when 
discussing a party who is forced to arbitrate pursuant to this doctrine. 
 9. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A)-(C) (permitting appeals of interlocutory orders denying 
motions to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings pending arbitration). 
 10. The Seventh Amendment states: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
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The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial in federal 
courts for actions that existed at law11 prior to the merger of law and equity 
that occurred with the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12  
By permitting nonsignatories to make unfair use of arbitration clauses, 
plaintiffs may lose the right to have a jury hear legal claims.  This is 
because, in these instances, the plaintiff may not fairly anticipate having to 
arbitrate with a nonsignatory.  The effect is a prime collateral consequence 
of the broad federal pro-arbitration policy, which the Supreme Court 
endorsed in Carlisle by refusing to categorically require that a litigant be a 
party to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause in order to 
possess an ability to stay litigation—and by logical extension, to compel 
arbitration—under the FAA.13 
There has been little literature on this topic.  One commentator, 
Professor Jean Sternlight, has suggested that the federal policy in favor of 
binding arbitration14 may in many instances have the general effect of 
denying litigants a right to trial by jury.15  This is because these litigants 
often do not knowingly or intelligently waive their right to jury trial when 
they are forced to arbitrate under the FAA.16  Indeed, the pro-arbitration 
policy in many cases trumps alternative considerations and courts 
frequently consider it a dispositive factor.17  The actions taken by courts in 
cases that apply equitable estoppel provide a convincing illustration of this 
aspect.  Another commentator, Frank LaForge, uses these cases to illustrate 
that permitting nonsignatories to compel arbitration under the theory of 
 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 11. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504-07 (1959) (discussing the 
impact of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the 
analysis of standards for equitable jurisdiction). 
 12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”). 
 13. 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009). 
 14. See e.g., Hall St. Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (discussing 
the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA). 
 15. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's 
Preference for Binding Arbitration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of 
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10-19 (1997) (positing that the 
Supreme Court’s preference for binding arbitration over litigation is unconstitutional). 
 16. See infra Section III.C (discussing jurisprudence of jury trial waivers).  In addition, 
Sternlight suggests that the pro-arbitration policy preference may pose numerous other 
constitutional problems.  See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 7 (suggesting that some binding 
arbitration clauses may violate the Due Process Clause and deny prospective litigants the 
right to an Article III judge). 
 17. See, e.g., Realty Trust Group, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
91331, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007) (“In general, courts recognize a strong federal 
policy in favor of arbitration, and any doubts about the scope of an agreement are to be 
resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”). 
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equitable estoppel is not equitable at all, principally because, as noted 
above, the theory lacks the requirements of misrepresentation and 
detrimental reliance, and confuses the actual parties at controversy.18 
This article contends that a litigant’s right to jury trial can be unfairly 
usurped partially because of LaForge’s analysis that allowing 
nonsignatories to invoke arbitration clauses under this doctrine maintains 
no basis in traditional equity principles.  Moreover, as a corollary to 
LaForge’s argument, this article further contends that a party who is forced 
to arbitrate under the latter application of equitable estoppel cannot be said 
to have either knowingly waived his right to jury trial or mutually assented 
to an agreement to arbitrate with a nonsignatory.  The FAA seems to 
attempt to prevent the latter consequence in the statutory text by requiring 
the existence of a written agreement before a party may avail itself of the 
ability to stay litigation or compel arbitration.19  However, just as many 
other cases before it, Carlisle embraced the broad federal pro-arbitration 
policy and rejected the latter limiting provision, implicitly sanctioning the 
ability of nonsignatories to divest litigants of their right to jury trial.20  This 
is, moreover, only one potential consequence.  Worse yet, without a 
“written agreement” limitation, third-party nonsignatories could likely have 
unfettered access to arbitration clauses to which they were not initially a 
party. 
This article proceeds as follows:  Sections II.A and II.B give a brief 
overview of the historical origins of American arbitration law.  Section II.C 
introduces the applicable provisions under the FAA that permit 
nonsignatories both to compel arbitration and to stay litigation.  Section 
II.D discusses the Seventh Amendment and the right to trial by jury in civil 
actions.  Finally, Section III presents the argument that the broad holding in 
Carlisle implicitly sanctions the common practice in federal courts of 
allowing nonsignatories access to arbitration clauses under a misapplication 
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  Because a litigant is unfairly required 
to arbitrate and cannot be said to have legitimately waived his right to jury 
trial under these circumstances, this is but one of the opinion’s foreseeable 
consequences that may violate the Constitution. 
 
 18. See LaForge, supra note 4, at 242-47 (distinguishing the Fifth Circuit’s test in 
Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2000) from the 
traditional principles of equitable estoppel requiring both misrepresentation and detrimental 
reliance). 
 19. See infra Section III.A (discussing implications of equitable estoppel on the right to 
jury trial). 
 20. 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009). 
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II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 
The United States legal system acquired its early views toward 
arbitration from English jurisprudence.21  This procured mentality involved 
judicial hostility to enforcing arbitration agreements, and was the basis for 
the ultimate enactment of the FAA.22 The latter fact provides context for 
understanding both the federal pro-arbitration policy and the current 
preference of many courts for arbitration over litigation under a variety of 
circumstances, even when maintaining that preference may be inequitable 
and may potentially run afoul of the Constitution. 
A. A Brief History of Arbitration in England 
The collapse of the Roman Empire brought forth a near halt in 
international commerce in Europe.23  The cohesive structure of the Roman 
Empire was ultimately replaced with a decentralized system of regional 
interaction, particularly with respect to trade.24  The eleventh century, 
however, brought increased agricultural production, enabling society to 
sustain growing populations.25  In turn, urban migration increased, and 
merchant classes emerged.26 
These merchants, separated by various barriers, needed a mechanism 
to facilitate trade.27  The mechanism that met this demand was the law 
merchant, an informal body of rules created to enforce merchant trading 
customs.28  Because of a lack of a uniform centralized body of governance, 
disputes were typically adjudicated by private arbitration.29  Merchants 
 
 21. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme 
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 644-47 (1996) 
(discussing early American arbitration jurisprudence). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See JAMES WILLIAM ERMATINGER, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
68 (Greenwood Press 2004) (chronicling the history of the Roman Empire’s collapse and its 
effect on increased regional interaction). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Peter T. Leeson, One More Time With Feeling:  The Law Merchant, 
Arbitration, and International Trade, 2007 INDIAN J. OF ECON. & BUS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 29, 
30 (discussing development of merchant classes that followed from increased agricultural 
production and urban migration). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 30 (“Merchants throughout Europe were separated by language, distance, 
and local law. To facilitate trade and interaction a common set of commercial ‘rules’ was 
needed.”). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.; see also Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act:  The Supreme Court's 
Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. 
REV. 789, 793 (2002) (attributing the continued practice of arbitration in England since the 
medieval period to the “need for a speedy and efficient dispute resolution mechanism as . . . 
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chose arbitrators who could facilitate efficient adjudication of disputes and 
account for cultural differences with foreign traders.30 
For centuries, arbitration remained the primary method for resolving 
commercial disputes in England.31  Eventually, however, English common 
law judges became hostile toward arbitration, fearing that its continued use 
would weaken the English court system.32  Accordingly, it became routine 
for judges to avoid enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts.33 
B. Early American Arbitration and the Passage of the Federal Arbitration 
Act 
The English judicial hostility to arbitration agreements crept into the 
 
[merchants] traded . . . in foreign markets”). 
 30. Id. at 793.  Interestingly, the early popularity of arbitration formed somewhat out of 
market distrust of state-sponsored methods for dispute resolution.  See Leeson, supra note 
25, at 31-32 (responding to critics who suggest otherwise).  Professor Leeson writes: 
In the 20th century private international arbitration associations sprung up. 
Arbitration associations operate much like the medieval merchant courts 
discussed above. These organizations emerged in response to the demands of 
international traders who viewed state courts as inferior mechanisms of dispute 
resolution. State courts posed a number of practical problems for resolving 
international commercial disagreements. Competing jurisdictional claims 
between states was one issue. The refusal of some nations’ courts to adjudicate 
international commercial contracts was another. 
Id. 
 31. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:  The Case Against 
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 
UMKC L. REV. 449, 461 (1996) (noting the primacy of arbitration throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
 32. See id. (“Eventually, however, common law judges became concerned that the 
merchants’ ability to systematically circumvent common law court procedures by agreeing 
to submit their disputes to arbitration had resulted in a reduction of the judges' salaries.” 
(citing Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746))). 
 33. Professor Cole suggests, “[t]o avoid losing fees to arbitrators, common law judges 
developed what came to be known as the ‘ouster doctrine.’  Allegedly originating in the 
seventeenth century, judges used the ouster doctrine to invalidate executory agreements to 
arbitrate in a series of cases during the eighteenth century.”  Id. at 462.  Although most 
disputes submitted to arbitration during this time were commercial in nature, courts often 
found ways around enforcing arbitration clauses.  See Jeffery W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public 
Policy:  The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 272 (1990) (“In some 
English cases, the courts found predispute arbitration agreements voidable at the option of 
either party.  In other cases, probably the majority, the courts viewed the arbitration 
agreement, particularly if it was evidenced by a signed writing, as a legitimate contract, but 
one that was not specifically enforceable.”). 
The doctrine of revocability was another mechanism used by the courts to circumvent 
enforcing arbitration clauses.  See Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Backgrounds of 
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 138 (1934) (tracing the doctrine of 
revocability to dictum by Lord Coke in Vynior’s Case, 8 Co. 80a, 81b, (1609)). 
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early colonies that became the United States,34 but as the country grew, 
merchants increasingly turned to arbitration to adjudicate commercial 
disputes.35  Thus, the business community eventually sought to reverse the 
residual judicial hostility,36 and looked to Congress for a solution.37  
Congress answered with the passage of the FAA. 
The original draft of what would ultimately become the FAA was 
enacted in 1925,38 principally to address the problems of judicial hostility 
toward arbitration in the United States court system.39  Despite initial 
questions on the federal exclusivity of arbitration,40 the Supreme Court 
eventually interpreted the FAA to preempt state law limiting the ability of 
parties to submit their claims to arbitration at variance with the FAA.41  
Still, state law plays a very important role in federal arbitration 
jurisprudence with respect to providing guidance as to whether a contract 
 
 34. See Stempel, supra note 33, at 274 (discussing the early development of American 
arbitration). 
 35. Id. at 275.  See also William C. Jones, An Inquiry Into the History of the 
Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 445, 461-62 (1958) (“Statistics are not available and it is doubtful that they ever will 
be, but it is probable that in the nineteenth century arbitration in one form or another became 
the most important form of mercantile dispute settlement . . . in the United States . . . 
although courts continued, of course, to be used.”). 
 36. See Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) 
(recognizing the general displeasure in the business community with courts’ unwillingness 
to enforce arbitration agreements in the early twentieth century).  This view, however, was 
not uniform, and many courts began to take individual notice of the need for a jurisprudence 
favoring arbitration, even though a national policy favoring arbitration had not yet been 
made official.  See e.g., Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 290-92 (N.Y. 
1921) (Cardozo, J.) (recognizing the importance of arbitration agreements, but noting 
common law limitations on enforcement). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1-2 (1924). 
 38. 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)). 
 39. The original act was not initially known as the FAA; it was known as the United 
States Federal Arbitration Act (“USAA”).  IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 
102-15 (1992).  The American Bar Association (“ABA”), following a series of legislative 
exchanges with Congress, ultimately submitted a bill in 1923, which Congress enacted 
without much change.  See generally id. at 102 (providing a more in-depth discussion about 
the legislative history of the FAA). 
 40. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 
(1842), on the ground that it is unconstitutional to permit federal courts to ignore state 
autonomy by applying federal substantive common law, and thus held that federal district 
courts are required to apply state substantive law in diversity cases.  The Court later applied 
the basic Erie principle to require the application of state arbitration law in 1956, creating 
obvious conflicts with the substantive provisions of the FAA.  See MACNEIL, supra note 39, 
at 136, 169 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)). 
 41. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984) (holding that the FAA 
preempts state law limiting the enforcement of arbitration agreements); cf. Kenneth F. 
Dunham, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197, 199 (2006) (discussing alternative views on the 
implications of Southland). 
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containing an arbitration clause is valid in the first instance.42 
C. The Basic Structure of the FAA and the General Right to Stay Litigation 
and Compel Arbitration Pursuant to a Valid Contract 
The FAA—codified at Title 9 of the United States Code43—provides a 
federal mechanism for the recognition of agreements to arbitrate claims.44  
The Act has a domestic portion,45 and codifies two international arbitration 
treaties:  The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards (“The New York Convention”),46 and the Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.47  This article focuses 
on the domestic sections dealing with parties’ ability to compel arbitration 
and stay litigation pursuant to otherwise valid agreements.48 
The first of these sections, 9 U.S.C. § 3, provides in pertinent part: 
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the 
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an 
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such 
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in 
such or proceeding is referable to arbitration under . . . [the] 
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial 
of the action until such arbitration . . . [occurs].49  
 
Thus, § 3 provides the statutory authority for district courts to stay 
trials pending arbitration in cases for which federal subject matter 
jurisdiction already exists.50  Section 4 provides: 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of 
 
 42. Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law:  Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration 
Act Preeemption, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2250, 2253 (2002) (discussing the extent of federal 
preemption of state arbitration law); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of 
Southland:  Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 101, 112 (2002) (discussing the Southland Court’s examination of the 
legislative history of the FAA in the latter regard). 
 43. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. 
 44. Id. § 2 (“A written provision . . . evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
 45. Id. §§ 1-16. 
 46. Id. §§ 201-08. 
 47. Id. §§ 301-07. 
 48. Whether the domestic sections of the act apply concomitantly with the foreign 
provisions can be significant in many contexts.  See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 464 (1994) (discussing the various views 
and interpretative problems on the application of the domestic provisions of the FAA to the 
international provisions). 
 49. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. 
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another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may 
petition any United States district court which, save for such 
agreement, would have jurisdiction . . . of the subject matter of a 
suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an 
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner 
provided for in such agreement.51 
 
This section establishes a mechanism for a litigant to petition the 
district court for an order to compel arbitration when an opposing party 
who has previously agreed to arbitrate claims under an agreement suddenly 
refuses to do so.52  The litigant must present another basis for federal 
subject matter jurisdiction before the court may compel arbitration53—
again, at least with respect to domestic actions.54 
 Thus, §§ 3 and 4 are the primary vehicles both to stay proceedings 
pending arbitration and to compel arbitration when necessary.55  In 
addition, the FAA provides for an interlocutory appeal of the refusal to 
grant a stay under § 3 and a denial of a petition under § 4.56 
Section 16, which deals with such appeals under §§ 3 and 4, provides 
in pertinent part: 
   
  (a) An appeal may be taken from— 
  
 (1) an order— 
 
  (A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of 
this title, 
 
 (B) denying a petition under section 4 of this 
title.57  
 
Accordingly, assuming that a valid contract exists, a denial of a 
 
 51. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Cf. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Egyptian Arab Republic, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 
1996) (finding subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case to enforce an award rendered in 
another country—on grounds other than under the New York Convention—in order to 
illustrate the availability of a right to enforcement under U.S. arbitration law).  As an 
interesting caveat, the Chromalloy decision has been heavily criticized by many scholars.  
See, e.g., William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 805, 807 (1999) (noting that the court reached this conclusion “[i]n an opinion 
[supported by] neither precedent nor progeny”). 
 55. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. 
 56. Id. § 16. 
 57. Id. 
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motion to stay litigation or to compel arbitration may be appealed 
immediately.58  Most importantly, the ability to compel or to request a stay 
appears to call for the existence of a contract containing an agreement to 
arbitrate disputes.  As this article illustrates, concluding from these sections 
that Congress did not intend to place a limiting gloss on state substantive 
contract law by imposing a requirement that there be a written agreement 
between parties before a litigant may avail itself of these provisions leads to 
a result that is potentially problematic from a policy perspective,59 and 
constitutionally deficient. 
D. The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial 
“The Seventh Amendment preserves to litigants the right to jury trial 
in suits at common law.”60  The Supreme Court has set forth further rules 
explaining the meaning of the Seventh Amendment and providing a context 
for understanding when a litigant is to be afforded the right to trial by 
jury.61  Specifically, courts are to apply a “historical test,” ascertaining 
whether the parties to a cause of action would have had the right to have 
their claims tried by a jury in England in 1791—the time at which the 
Seventh Amendment was adopted.62  Generally, if a party’s claim involves 
an action at law—meaning that it could have been brought in a court with 
legal jurisdiction at the common law63—a jury must be afforded if properly 
 
 58. Id.  Section 16 provides a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  The final judgment rule provides that appeals from district court rulings generally can 
be taken only if the district court has rendered final decisions on the issues presented below.  
28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. 
L. REV. 1237, 1247-70 (2007) (discussing other well-recognized exceptions to the final 
judgment rule). 
 59. See Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1093-94 (2009) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (noting the policy problems presented by permitting nonsignatories to avail 
themselves of arbitration clauses in order to obtain stays of litigation under § 3). 
 60. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII 
(guaranteeing the right to trial by jury in suits at common law when the value in controversy 
exceeds a minimum value of twenty dollars). 
 61. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (holding that legal claims 
must be tried to a jury before any equitable claims with overlapping issues of fact can be 
decided).  The Court has further held that equitable issues must be tried after legal issues 
even if they are only incidental to the equitable issues.  Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 
469, 473-74 (1962). 
 62. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); see also Margaret L. Moses, What the 
Jury Must Hear:  The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 199 (2000) (“The historical test is one means of determining 
whether parties to a particular action have the right to a jury trial.”). 
 63. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830) (finding that the Seventh 
Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial for suits in “law” within the meaning of 
Article III). 
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requested.64  The overarching common law distinction between law and 
equity has been replaced, however, as there is now only one form of action 
permitted in the federal courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  
a civil action.65  Moreover, the analysis becomes more complicated if the 
claim is for an action that did not exist at the common law, neither as an 
equitable nor legal claim.66 
In Ross v. Bernhard, the Supreme Court developed a three-pronged 
test to ascertain whether the right to trial by jury exists in cases that present 
neither clearly legal nor clearly equitable claims.67  Specifically, the Court 
stated, “[a]s our cases indicate, the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined 
by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such 
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and 
limitations of juries.”68 
The extent to which the right to a jury trial is implicated at all in the 
following discussion, then, depends on whether a right to a jury trial exists 
in the first instance.  This article will not analyze numerous distinctive fact 
patterns in order to determine whether the right to trial by jury should be 
available in any one particular case; it suggests only that where a party’s 
claims are able to be submitted to a jury, they should be, and a 
nonsignatory should not be able to subvert that result by utilizing an 
arbitration clause under a misapplication of equitable estoppel. 
In undertaking this analysis, one must keep in mind that Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 38(b) provides that a party “waives [the right to] a jury 
trial” unless he complies with the demands of the rule.69  This latter aspect 
has substantial implication regarding the voluntariness of arbitration 
agreements in general, because if a party has signed an agreement to 
arbitrate claims, the argument ostensibly may be advanced that the right to 
trial by jury is waived as a result.70 
III. A DISCUSSION 
A. How the Federal Pro-Arbitration Policy Sometimes Usurps the Right to 
 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) (requiring that a party requesting a jury trial must make proper 
demand). 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”). 
 66. See Moses, supra note 62, at 197-99 (showing the Justices’ divergent views on the 
importance of finding historical analogues to current causes of action in ascertaining the 
right to a jury trial). 
 67. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
 68. Id. at 538 n.10.  The third prong articulated in Ross was altered in subsequent cases.  
See Moses, supra note 62, at 197 (providing more information on Ross and its progeny). 
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b).  Failure to make demand amounts to waiver.  Id. 
 70. See infra, Section III.C (discussing waiver issues in greater detail). 
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Trial by Jury 
 Because the FAA provides that ordinary common law contract 
principles still govern questions as to whether an agreement to arbitrate is 
actually valid,71 the result in cases where a party loses the right to a jury 
trial pursuant to an arbitration clause invoked by a nonsignatory under a 
traditional state contract theory may seem at first blush to accord with the 
Act’s mandates.  As noted in the section below, the Supreme Court, at least 
implicitly, agreed with this proposition in Carlisle. 
 1. Carlisle and Its Potential Implications 
 In May of 2009, the Supreme Court decided the case of Arthur 
Andersen, L.L.P. v. Carlisle.72  In this case, the Court was faced with two 
questions:  (1) whether § 16 of the FAA vests federal courts with 
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over denials of motions to stay under § 
3 filed by nonsignatories to arbitration agreements; and (2) whether 
nonsignatories can obtain stays of litigation under the FAA in any event.73 
In Carlisle, the three respondents sold their construction company 
seeking to minimize tax liability from the sale.74  Through a series of 
consultations with their tax advisor, Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., they were 
referred to two other firms for legal advice on the transaction.75  These 
firms recommended that the respondents implement a “‘leveraged option 
strategy’ tax shelter designed to create illusory losses through foreign-
currency-exchange options.”76  Further, in line with the advice, the 
respondents created various limited liability corporations to carry out the 
 
 71. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 72. 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009). 
 73. Id. at 1896-99.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on these issues, see Carlisle v. 
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, L.L.P., 521 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2008), cert granted, 
Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 529 (2008), to resolve confusion among 
circuits.  Compare Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that 
nonsignatories can compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel and that the 
court had jurisdiction to hear appeals of denials of motions to compel pursuant to that 
theory), with DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 680-83 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding 
that § 16(a)(1)(A) or (B) is insufficient to give appellate jurisdiction to a nonsignatory’s 
attempt to compel arbitration pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel).  One court 
previously attempted to reconcile the differences between opinions of different courts in 
cases implicating the international provisions of the FAA.  See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Asimco Int'l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that nonsignatories should be 
permitted to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 206 and that nothing in the statutory 
language suggests there is any limitation on this right—or the right to appeal denials of a 
motion to compel). 
 74. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1899. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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scheme, and these corporations “entered into investment-management 
agreements with [one of the firms,]” which required all disputes arising out 
of the agreements to be submitted to arbitration.77  The IRS later 
determined the scheme to be an illegal tax shelter, and the respondents 
subsequently filed a diversity suit against all of the firms under the 
agreements for rendering flawed and fraudulent advice.78 
The defendant-firms that were not signatories to the underlying 
investment-management agreements moved to stay the action under § 3 of 
the FAA, “arguing that the principles of equitable estoppel demanded that 
respondents arbitrate their claims under the investment agreements.”79  The 
district court denied the motion, and the nonsignatory firms appealed.80  
The Sixth Circuit held that it did not have appellate jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under § 16(a)(1) of the FAA because that section only makes 
reviewable the denial of a motion under § 3, and § 3 requires the existence 
of a written agreement between the parties who wish to arbitrate, which 
was ostensibly absent in the case.81 
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit on the jurisdictional 
question.82  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that “[§ 16] 
unambiguously makes the underlying merits [of an appeal] irrelevant, for 
even utter frivolousness of the underlying request for a § 3 stay cannot turn 
a denial into something other than ‘an order . . . refusing a stay of any 
action under section 3.’”83  Thus, the Court held that “any litigant who asks 
for [and is denied] a stay . . . is entitled to an immediate appeal.”84 
But Justice Scalia did not stop at holding that lower courts should not 
conflate the jurisdictional question under § 16 with the underlying merits 
question—that is, whether a litigant is entitled to invoke an arbitration 
clause—but he continued to address the Court of Appeals’ “ground for 
finding [the] appeal meritless[.]”85  In doing so, he echoed the same federal 
pro-arbitration mantra that the Court has systematically repeated in the 
past.86  The Court reasoned that, because § 2 of the FAA “creates 
substantive federal law regarding the enforceability of arbitration 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1900. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
 82. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1900. 
 83. Id. at 1901 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16). 
 84. Id. at 1900. 
 85. Id. at 1901 (noting that “if the Court of Appeals is correct on the merits point we 
will have awarded petitioners a remarkably hollow victory.”). 
 86. Id. (stating that arbitration agreements should be placed on equal footing with other 
contracts (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 478 (1989))). 
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agreements,” it does not purport to “alter background principles of state 
contract law regarding the scope of agreements[.]”87  And, as a logical 
subsequent inference, categorically mandating the existence of a written 
agreement to invoke § 3—and by extension, § 16—ignores the fact that, 
under traditional state contract law, nonparties can enforce contracts.88 
The result broadens the scope of access to arbitration agreements and 
is part and parcel with the federal pro-arbitration policy.89  That is, by 
attempting to craft a narrow holding on the scope of appellate jurisdiction 
under § 16, and by ignoring the apparent textual mandate of a written 
agreement between parties under § 3, Justice Scalia has implicitly 
sanctioned the ability of federal courts to allow nonsignatories to 
arbitration agreements the option of staying litigation and compelling 
arbitration under a potential surfeit of theories that unfairly may usurp the 
jury trial right. 
 Justice Souter, writing for the dissent in Carlisle, noted the problem 
of permitting nonsignatories to invoke § 3, but under different reasoning.  
Specifically, he wrote that, because of the federal policy disfavoring 
interlocutory appeals, § 3 should be read to impose a federal requirement 
that a written agreement exist before a party may be permitted to stay court 
proceedings pending arbitration.90  This independent limitation seems to be 
reasonable given that § 3 textually permits a court to grant stays only where 
there is “an agreement in writing,”91 and § 4 appears to permit parties to 
compel arbitration only under “a written agreement.”92  As Justice Souter 
stated, this requirement would “provid[e] a bright-line rule with predictable 
results to aid courts in determining jurisdiction over § 16 interlocutory 
appeals . . . [and] mitigat[e] the risk of intentional delay by savvy parties 
who seek to frustrate litigation by gaming the system.”93  More importantly 
for the purposes of this article, however, the requirement would also 
eliminate the ability of courts to eradicate a signatory-party’s right to jury 
trial and access to the court system for the mere sake of efficiency and the 
federal pro-arbitration policy. 
 Again, it must be acknowledged that Justice Scalia attempted to 
narrow the Court’s holding by stating that “we need not decide here 
whether the relevant state contract law recognizes equitable estoppel as a 
 
 87. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1901-02. 
 88. Id. at 1902 (noting that such nonparties can enforce an agreement under doctrines 
such as “‘assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, 
third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel[.]’”  (quoting 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON & 
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 57.19 (4th ed. 2001))). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1903-04 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 91. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
 92. Id. § 4. 
 93. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1904 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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ground for enforcing contracts against third parties, what standard it would 
apply, and whether petitioners would be entitled to relief under it.”94  Yet, 
by refusing to categorically exempt third parties from enforcing arbitration 
clauses under § 3, he has given courts a carte blanche to disregard litigants’ 
right of access to the courts.  To illustrate this proposition, this article uses 
only the application of equitable estoppel by many circuits—a doctrine 
under which courts often do not determine whether an arbitration clause is 
valid, but inquire only as to whether a nonsignatory can avail itself of the 
clause—as a prime example.  This application lends to a remarkably unfair 
result not supported by an application of true common law equitable 
estoppel.95  It permits the plaintiffs, in the mentioned cases, to lose 
completely the right to have their legal claims heard by a jury and gives 
appellate courts the opportunity to review such denials, vesting another 
judicial body with the capacity to usurp the traditional jury function.96  
However, how the jury trial right is implicated in these cases must first be 
discussed. 
 2. How the Right to Jury Trial is Implicated in Equitable 
Estoppel Cases 
 Perhaps the ultimate result in Carlisle is supported by the federal 
policy preferring arbitration to litigation in most circumstances.97  It may 
even be argued that it promotes efficiency in many respects because most 
cases presenting this issue involve a plaintiff asserting claims against 
numerous defendants—claims that involve many overlapping issues of law 
and fact.  But this policy preference of efficiency should not come at the 
expense of constitutional rights and fairness to litigants who have little 
means of otherwise altering their conduct in order to avoid having a 
nonsignatory avail itself of an arbitration clause. 
 In the spirit of this argument, Professor Sternlight has shown that 
practitioners and courts have largely ignored various constitutional 
violations presented by the federal policy favoring binding arbitration.98  As 
 
 94. Id. at 1903. 
 95. See infra Section II.B. (suggesting that this happens because, in such cases, the 
courts do not apply the rules of traditional estoppel and do not require a minimal showing of 
misrepresentation and detrimental reliance). 
 96. See infra Section II.B. (stating that when the court allows a nonsignatory defendant 
to compel arbitration, the plaintiff loses his right to a jury trial). 
 97. See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that permitting 
nonsignatories to avail themselves of arbitration clauses under the theory of equitable 
estoppel accords with the federal pro-arbitration policy and avoids “unnecessary 
complexities in cases involving arbitration agreements”). 
 98. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (recognizing that the federal preference 
for arbitration often denies plaintiffs of their right to trial by jury).  As an interesting 
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mentioned below in Section III.C., she notably contends that, because 
traditional waiver standards required for the relinquishment of the jury trial 
right are not even considered by most courts, many arbitration agreements 
simply usurp the right without any contemplation of the collateral effects.99  
This is particularly true when arbitration clauses are unfairly imposed.100 
Indeed, it must be acknowledged that a jury can provide the benefit of 
a neutral—and perhaps sympathetic—factfinder in cases where an 
opposing party has much greater resources.101  However, the fact that a jury 
 
corollary on efficiency considerations, one commentator has similarly suggested that courts 
sometimes ignore the requirements of the Seventh Amendment in the dispositive motion 
context.  See Craig M. Reiser, Comment, The Unconstitutional Application of Summary 
Judgment in Factually Intensive Inquiries, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 195, 221 (2009) 
(“[P]rinciples of judicial economy make it easy to comprehend why there may be a 
proclivity to enter docket-clearing summary judgment grants in weak jury cases . . . [but] 
compromising constitutional rights for efficiency’s sake is an unconstitutional solution.”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute 
for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 22 (2003); see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth 
J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions:  Efficient Business 
Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 102 n. 167 (2004) 
(recognizing that unconscionable arbitration clauses prevent the law from being properly 
enforced).  Professor Sternlight notes that “[a]lthough one of the most significant aspects of 
mandatory arbitration is that it denies claimants access to court or to a jury trial, lawyers, 
courts, and policy makers have typically failed to pay sufficient attention to jury trial 
guarantees.”  Sternlight, supra, at 20.  Professor Sternlight discusses the willingness of some 
state courts to address the obvious implication of a litigant potentially losing the right to trial 
by jury pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause.  See id. at 21 (citing Kloss v. Edward D. 
Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring) (discussing the holding of the 
case where a litigant did not waive her Montana right to trial by jury by signing an 
agreement to arbitrate because voluntariness was not shown)).  Interestingly, she also 
discusses how other state courts are unwilling to address this problem.  See id. at 32 (citing 
Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989) (upholding an 
agreement to arbitrate despite the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge as to the existence of an 
arbitration clause in the contract)). 
 101. The Supreme Court has also offered the following rationale in favor of a jury:  
“Twelve men of the average of the community . . . know more of the common affairs of life 
than does one man, [and it is assumed] that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from 
admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.”  R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 
(1873). 
However, overly extolling the virtues of a jury trial may unfairly devalue the benefit 
arbitration provides to litigants—particularly businesses—who desire quicker and more 
efficient dispute resolution.  See Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business 
Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 106 (1997) (stating that 
“[a]rbitration is intended to provide a quicker, less expensive, and more private alternative 
to litigation”). 
Further, this article does not purport to suggest that juries may be superior in all respects to 
experts in adjudicating complicated disputes.  The Supreme Court has recognized this 
aspect, for example, by holding that the construction questions on patents are to be made by 
judges.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379-81 (1996) (noting the 
limitations of juries). 
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trial is a constitutional right in the first instance cannot be refuted.102  The 
Supreme Court has itself recognized that arbitration should not be a matter 
of coercion in stripping litigants of their right of access to the courts,103 and 
it has further suggested that the FAA “‘does not require parties to arbitrate 
when they have not agreed to do so.’”104  As this article attempts to show, 
in cases where a nonsignatory is permitted to compel arbitration under a 
misapplication of traditional equitable estoppel, what occurs in substance is 
that a litigant who was not an actual or anticipated party to the agreement 
can bind another who was, preventing her from receiving her day in court 
before a jury.105 
Furthermore, although the FAA makes arbitration clauses enforceable 
on the basis of state law—as expressed in Carlisle under § 2106—it seems 
unlikely that Congress originally intended that this substantive provision 
would permit federal courts to adopt a rule allowing a nonsignatory to 
unfairly submit another party to arbitration pursuant to a flawed theory.  
This is evidenced by the seemingly independent requirement of a written 
agreement stated in §§ 3 and 4, a limitation that Justice Scalia rejected.107  
In that vein, the following section discusses just how various federal courts 
both frequently and unfairly misapply equitable estoppel. 
B. Misapplying Equitable Estoppel 
 Carlisle’s implicit sanction of the application of equitable estoppel 
adopted by many circuits is but one of the potential encompassing effects 
of the Court’s decision to keep the door open for nonsignatory third parties 
to utilize arbitration agreements at the expense of litigants’ jury trial rights.  
In that vein, Frank LaForge’s argument illustrates the problems with 
equitable estoppel as it is applied by courts in this context.108  Namely, he 
 
 102. See supra Section II.C. (recognizing that there is a constitutional right to trial by 
jury). 
 103. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (noting that 
“‘[a]rbitration under the [FAA]’” should be “‘a matter of consent, not coercion’” (quoting 
Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989))). 
 104. Id. at 293 (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc., 489 U.S. at 478 (1989)). 
 105. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (describing how traditional equitable 
estoppel doctrine is often misapplied in these cases). 
 106. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (noting that written agreements to settle controversies by 
arbitration are valid and enforceable). 
 107. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1899-2002 (2009). 
 108. LaForge, supra note 4.  LaForge uses the case of Grigson v. Creative Artists 
Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2000), to illustrate the common factual presentation 
in cases where nonsignatories seek to compel arbitration.  See Laforge, supra, at 232 (noting 
that Grigson is one of the “two most important cases regarding the use of equitable estoppel 
to compel signatories to arbitrate with nonsignatories”).  In Grigson, two producers of a 
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suggests—first noting the obvious quandary with the typical case in that a 
plaintiff and a nonsignatory defendant do not actually agree to arbitrate—
that courts applying equitable estoppel in these cases effectively confuse 
the actual parties at controversy and neglect to apply the misrepresentation 
and detrimental reliance requirements of traditional estoppel.109  That is, 
these courts view the nonsignatory defendant as entering into a 
hypothetical agreement to arbitrate claims with the plaintiff, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff could have had any reasonable means of anticipating 
such a result.  But this view ostensibly distorts the traditional equitable 
estoppel doctrine, which requires a minimal showing of misrepresentation 
and detrimental reliance.110  In essence, the approach obfuscates traditional 
contract law, and leads to uncertainty and unfairness.111 
 Moreover, in a case where a nonsignatory can compel arbitration or 
stay litigation under this application of equitable estoppel, courts do not 
necessarily look at the actions or conduct of the plaintiff who initiates the 
litigation; they look only at the face of the plaintiff’s claims against a 
signatory-defendant in order to ascertain whether there are overlapping 
issues with claims filed against a nonsignatory-defendant.112  This in turn 
 
horror movie sued the movie’s distribution company, alleging that the company failed to 
distribute the movie as originally agreed upon.  See id. at 234 (citing Grigson, 210 F.3d at 
526).  The producers also sued the agency of one of the stars of the movie for allegedly 
interfering with the movie’s distribution and aiding the breach.  See id. at 234-35 (noting 
that the defendants joined Grigson in another suit against Creative Artists and Matthew 
McConaughey for tortious interference with the distribution agreement).  The agency sought 
to enforce an arbitration clause contained in the agreement between the distribution 
company and the plaintiff-producers on the grounds that the plaintiff-producers were 
equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate all claims arising from the distribution 
agreement.  Id. 
In addition, as LaForge demonstrates, the presumption in most of these cases—even if it is 
unreasonable—is that the plaintiff will attempt to hold a nonsignatory-defendant liable 
under duties imposed by an underlying agreement, and as such, the nonsignatory-defendant 
should be permitted to avail himself of the arbitration provisions in that agreement.  Id. at 
231-39. 
 109. Id. at 242-44. 
 110. Id. at 245 (citing 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8:3 (4th ed.)).  This definition of the traditional showing of estoppel 
has been articulated by the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Community Health Services of 
Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 61 (1984), where the Court noted that “[t]o analyze the 
nature of a . . . party's detrimental change in position, we must identify the manner in which 
reliance on the [other party’s] misconduct has caused [him] to change his position for the 
worse.”  Other sources specify these requirements as well.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) AGENCY § 8B (1957) (suggesting that estoppel prevents a party from insisting on 
the truth of a statement contrary to a representation made upon which another party 
detrimentally relied). 
 111. See infra Section III.C. (discussing the negative impact this practice can have on the 
plaintiff’s rights). 
 112. See LaForge, supra note 4, at 249-50 (describing how this practice does not follow 
traditional estoppel doctrine). 
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may necessitate that the case against the nonsignatory be tried in 
arbitration.113  And again, these courts fail to consider whether the plaintiff 
in fact made any misrepresentation upon which the nonsignatory defendant 
detrimentally relied.114 
 The quintessential case demonstrating the latter application of 
equitable estoppel is MS Dealer Services Corp. v. Franklin.115  In that case, 
the Eleventh Circuit specified two separate circumstances under which a 
nonsignatory can compel arbitration:  first, where the signatory’s claims 
against the nonsignatory presume the existence of an underlying written 
agreement to arbitrate or rely on the affirmative provisions of such an 
agreement; and second, where the signatory’s claims “‘raise[] allegations 
of . . . substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the 
nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.’”116 
 In MS Dealer, the plaintiff executed a buyer’s order to purchase a 
vehicle from an automobile dealership.117  As part of that order, she was 
charged for a third-party service contract with MS Dealer, a nonsignatory 
to the underlying agreement.118  The buyer’s order contained an arbitration 
clause which provided that “‘all disputes and controversies of every kind 
and nature between the parties . . . arising out of or in connection with this 
contract . . . shall be submitted to binding arbitration[.]’”119  Shortly after 
the purchase of the car, the plaintiff discovered numerous defects in it, and 
filed suit against the dealership and MS Dealer, stating claims for fraud, 
breach of contract, conspiracy, and breach of warranty.120  Subsequently, 
MS Dealer sought to invoke the arbitration clause by compelling the 
plaintiff to arbitrate her claims against it on the theory of equitable 
estoppel.121  The district court denied the motion because MS Dealer was 
not a signatory to the buyer’s order and accordingly did not have legal 
standing to compel arbitration.122 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that both 
prongs of its test were satisfied.123  In particular, each of the plaintiff’s 
claims against MS Dealer made reference to and presumed the existence of 
the third-party service agreement, which was incorporated into the buyer’s 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999) (“MS Dealer”). 
 116. Id. at 947 (quoting Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1433 (M.D. 
Ala. 1997)). 
 117. Id. at 944. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing Buyer’s Order at 1). 
 120. MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 944. 
 121. Id. at 945. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 947. 
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order.124  However, more problematically, the court also held that the 
plaintiff’s claims against both the automobile dealer and MS Dealer were 
based on the same facts and were therefore “inherently inseparable.”125  To 
the latter point, the fact that the plaintiff alleged that MS Dealer conspired 
with the signatory defendant to defraud her was material because such 
allegation was “intimately founded in and intertwined with the obligations 
imposed by the [Buyer’s Order].”126 
 As an initial matter, the first prong in MS Dealer could arguably 
accord with traditional estoppel in that it conditions its application upon a 
plaintiff’s unreasonable reliance on a written agreement in asserting a claim 
against a nonsignatory—creating what is tantamount to an implicit 
unreasonable representation.  This test is problematic, though, because it 
distorts traditional estoppel via its second prong.  As one commentator 
notes, the second prong “contains no requirement that the action against the 
nonsignatory relate in any way to the agreement containing the arbitration 
provision, instead allowing the nonsignatory to take advantage of the 
provision if it makes allegations of ‘substantially interdependent and 
concerted misconduct.’”127  In that way, the latter prong fails to consider 
the nature of traditional equitable estoppel, as well as the other potential 
consequences presented by asserting such a broad proposition. 
 As noted, LaForge illustrates that this version of equitable estoppel 
both confuses the parties at controversy and is emphatically not a product 
of ordinary contract law.128  Regarding the first issue, LaForge shows that 
some courts, in applying the MS Dealer test, effectively confuse the actual 
parties at controversy by looking to actions of reliance of a hypothetical 
signatory party in order to find the necessary element of estoppel 
satisfied.129  This approach “bind[s] both [actual signatory] parties to 
arbitrate their contract-related claims against the world-at-large, not just 
each other.”130  On the second issue, the misrepresentation requirement is 
lacking in the MS Dealer test because that element essentially “considers 
only the plaintiff’s claims,” vitiating the need for an actual 
representation.131  That is, under the concerted misconduct prong created by 
MS Dealer, courts view the nonsignatory party as effectively stepping into 
 
 124. Id. at 947-48. 
 125. Id. at 948. 
 126. Id. (quoting Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1433 (M.D. Ala. 
1997)). 
 127. Christopher Driskill, Note, A Dangerous Doctrine:  The Case Against Using 
Concerted-Misconduct Estoppel to Compel Arbitration, 60 ALA. L. REV. 443, 453 (2009). 
 128. LaForge, supra note 4, at 245. 
 129. Id. at 243 (citing Grigson v. Creative Artist Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th 
Cir. 2000)). 
 130. Id. at 245. 
 131. Id. at 244. 
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the shoes of a third-party signatory.132  Extending this analysis, the 
nonsignatory again becomes a hypothetical signatory who “sought to avoid 
[the costs and expenses of litigation] by including the arbitration provision 
in its agreement . . . .”133  Yet this approach does not adequately consider 
the conduct of the parties directly at controversy because those parties had 
no agreement.  As LaForge reasons, “[w]here traditional estoppel considers 
the conduct of both parties . . . [this version] of estoppel makes an equitable 
determination by looking only at the plaintiff’s claims. . . . [but fails to] 
adequately determine what is equitable in . . . the relationship between the 
nonsignatory defendant and plaintiff . . . .”134 
 While the Eleventh Circuit eventually suggested that a party had to 
satisfy both prongs of the MS Dealer test in order to permit a nonsignatory 
to compel arbitration,135 many courts have subsequently neglected to 
impose such a restraint.136  Moreover, those courts utilizing the MS Dealer 
approach seem to effectively assume that because defendants are entitled to 
 
 132. Id. at 250. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 252. 
 135. Driskill, supra note 127, at 455 (discussing In re Humana, Inc. Managed Care 
Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
 136. See, e.g., Palmer Ventures, L.L.C. v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 06-30584, 254 Fed. 
Appx. 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2007) (permitting a nonsignatory to compel under an application of 
the MS Dealer test and noting that the test permits such a result under either prong); see also 
In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 193-94 (Tex. 2007) (“Merrill Lynch”) 
(discussing federal cases permitting parties to compel arbitration under the concerted 
misconduct prong and suggesting that these courts would effectively “sweep independent 
entities and even complete strangers into arbitration agreements”). 
Other circuits have applied equitable estoppel tests similar to the second prong of MS 
Dealer.  Specifically, some courts have permitted nonsignatories to compel arbitration 
where a plaintiff’s claims against multiple defendants satisfy the “‘intertwined-claims’ test.”  
Merrill Lynch at 193.  An example of this test can be found in Ross v. American Express, 
478 F.3d 96, 97 (2d Cir. 2007).  In Ross, the plaintiffs filed class action suits against various 
credit card companies, including American Express, alleging “violations of the Sherman Act 
arising from an alleged conspiracy to fix fees for the conversion of foreign currencies.”  
Ross at 97.  The district court held that nonsignatory defendants were permitted to take 
advantage of the arbitration clauses contained in the plaintiffs’ contracts with the other 
credit card companies under the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the issues in both 
cases were “inextricably intertwined,” but denied the motion to compel on other grounds, 
leading to an appeal.  Id. at 98 (citing Ross v. Am. Express Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21084 at *10).  The Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under § 16(a)(1) of the FAA 
to hear the appeal from the district court’s denial of the nonsignatory-defendant’s motion to 
compel, notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement to arbitrate with the plaintiff-
class.  Id. at 99.  The court noted that appellate jurisdiction over the denial was based on the 
principle that ordinary contract law presumptively governs arbitration under the FAA, and 
equitable estoppel is an essential tenant of ordinary contract law.  Id. 
This approach, though, has been interpreted to contain a requirement tantamount to the first 
prong of MS Dealer—namely, that the parties have a close enough relationship that the 
initial claims are based in part on the obligations under the contract containing the 
arbitration clause.  See Merrill Lynch, 235 S.W.3d at 193-94. 
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the benefit of the arbitration clause, the requirement of a written agreement 
to arbitrate under §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA is implicitly satisfied.137  In line 
with Professor Sternlight’s reasoning, however, bestowing the benefit of an 
arbitration agreement on a party who was not a signatory, and who did not 
detrimentally rely on a misrepresentation, unfairly usurps the other party’s 
right of access to the courts without so much as considering inequity or 
constitutional implication. 
 In sum, allowing a nonsignatory defendant to compel arbitration or 
to stay litigation under this formulation of the MS Dealer application of 
equitable estoppel fails to consider the underlying theoretical basis of 
traditional estoppel and, as LaForge concludes, leads to “inequitable 
results,” at least where concerted misconduct is all that is alleged.138  The 
plaintiff’s right to jury trial falls by the wayside of efficiency 
considerations and federal pro-arbitration policy.139  Finally, as discussed in 
the following section, it is unlikely that a waiver argument changes the 
ultimate result of a Seventh Amendment violation in these instances. 
C. Waiver 
The right to trial by jury may, like other constitutional rights, be 
waived.140  This proposition has obvious implications for agreements to 
arbitrate.  Accordingly, a discussion of jury trial waiver jurisprudence and 
its effect on arbitration clauses is necessary. 
Federal courts vary in their treatment of jury trial waivers.141  When 
assessing the validity of any waiver of a constitutional right, courts apply 
 
 137. See, e.g., Realty Trust Group, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
91331, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007) (discussing how the factors of the MS Dealer test 
relate to the requirement of a plaintiff’s reliance on a written agreement). 
 138. See infra Section III.C. 
 139. LaForge interestingly notes the rhetoric of one court that reiterated the pro-
arbitration policy in applying the second prong of MS Dealer.  See LaForge, supra note 4, at 
244 (noting that, in Grigson, the court “repeats the shibboleth that arbitration is favored in 
[the] law” by suggesting that “unless the plaintiff is estopped from litigating its claims 
against the nonsignatory defendant, the ‘federal policy in favor of arbitration [will be] 
effectively thwarted.’” (quoting Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 
527 (5th Cir. 2000))). 
 140. See Melissa Briggs Hutchens, At What Costs?:  When Consumers Cannot Afford the 
Costs of Arbitration in Alabama, 53 ALA. L. REV. 599, 602 n. 23 (2002) (explaining that the 
federal right to a jury trial can be waived) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD R. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, at 585 nn.10-11 (6th ed. 2000)). 
 141. Andrew M. Kepper, Note, Contractual Waiver of Seventh Amendment Rights:  
Using the Public Rights Doctrine to Justify a Higher Standard of Waiver for Jury-Waiver 
Clauses than for Arbitration Clauses, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2006) (citing Jean 
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right 
to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 675 (2001)). 
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different standards.142  Specifically, if the right to a jury trial in a civil case 
is to be waived, it typically must be done so knowingly and voluntarily.143 
While it is unclear whether the “knowing and voluntary” standard has 
ever applied to waivers in contracts containing only arbitration clauses but 
no explicit jury-waiver clauses, many commentators appear to recognize 
that most courts apply a more lenient waiver standard to arbitration 
agreements.144  Indeed, courts tend to view the “loss of the right to a jury 
trial . . . [as] a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to 
arbitrate.”145 
Because the FAA employs general state contract law principles to 
ascertain the validity of arbitration clauses in the first instance,146 many 
courts assume that one loses their right to a jury trial solely upon a minimal 
showing of mutual assent to enter into an underlying agreement containing 
such a clause.147  To this end, as another commentator puts it, “courts find 
consent to arbitration, not through the actual intentions or understandings 
of the parties, but by looking at whether a reasonable person would believe 
that an agreement to arbitrate had been reached.”148 
Professor Sternlight cogently explains that the vast majority of courts 
simply “conclude that the jury trial doctrines are not relevant” to arbitration 
clauses because of the federal policy favoring arbitration.149  She further 
argues that the “knowing and voluntary” standard applied to jury trial 
waiver clauses in general should be applied in the arbitration context.150  
That courts use the federal policy favoring arbitration as an excuse not to, 
 
 142. Id.; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 
(1989) (“Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary 
consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court.”). 
 143. See Leasing Service Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that 
the right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, while fundamental, “can be knowingly 
and intentionally waived by contract”); accord RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 
2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (reasoning that the “federal standard for determining the 
validity of a contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial is . . . whether the waiver was 
made in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner”); cf. Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 
F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that while waivers should be knowingly and 
voluntarily given, not every contract need mandate a waiver expressly). 
 144. See Kepper, supra note 141, at 1351-55 (“In contrast to jury-waiver clauses, federal 
courts generally do not employ a knowing and voluntary standard when determining the 
validity of arbitration clauses.”); see also Sternlight, supra note 141, at 698-99 (noting that 
most courts have applied objective contract rules on assent to arbitration clauses). 
 145. Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing 
to find that an arbitration clause contained in a contract was unconscionable despite the fact 
that the plaintiffs challenging it claimed that they were unaware of its implied limitations). 
 146. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 147. Kepper, supra note 141, at 1351. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Sternlight, supra note 141, at 711-13. 
 150. Id. 
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she contends, “is, quite simply, a non-explanation, because the Constitution 
is the Supreme Law of the Land.”151 
Professor Sternlight’s argument that the “knowing and voluntary” 
standard should apply uniformly is compelling because courts consistently 
fail to offer convincing explanations for why a federal statute seemingly 
dwarfs a constitutional right.  Moreover, Professor Sternlight’s illustration 
of these problems is amplified with respect to arbitration clauses contained 
in unfairly-imposed consumer contracts,152 but there are distinctions 
between the implications of the right to a jury trial with respect to these 
latter agreements, and those that simply cannot be said to have been 
products of a true “meeting of the minds.” 
It is axiomatic that forcing a plaintiff to arbitrate with a nonsignatory 
under the noted misapplication of equitable estoppel appears to implicate 
the Seventh Amendment because the plaintiff under these circumstances 
cannot be said to have knowingly or intelligently waived his right to trial 
by jury.  However, neither can he be said to have waived this right under 
the mutual assent standard.  That is because, in these cases, there is not an 
underlying agreement between the parties at issue.153  The absence of such 
an agreement necessitates the inference that plaintiffs who are forced to 
arbitrate with nonsignatory-defendants in cases applying the MS Dealer test 
never actually waived their right to a jury trial.154 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 By refusing to limit the ability of nonsignatories to avail themselves 
of arbitration clauses under the FAA, the Court’s decision in Carlisle may 
have a wider impact than Justice Scalia intended.  This is because his 
opinion has implicitly sanctioned the discretionary capacity of district 
judges to continue applying inequitable third-party theories in the 
 
 151. Id. at 716. 
 152. Sternlight, supra note 100, at 22-24. 
 153. See supra Section III.B. (discussing how the right to jury trial is implicated in 
equitable estoppel cases). 
 154. See, e.g., Driskill, supra note 127, at 456-60 (discussing courts that have permitted 
nonsignatories to compel arbitration under the second prong of the MS Dealer test).  On a 
related note, under Professor Sternlight’s suggestion that binding arbitration clauses 
contained in unfairly imposed consumer contracts could potentially constitute a violation of 
an individual’s Seventh Amendment rights, it is reasonable to infer that, at least in many 
cases presenting these circumstances, a litigant may have realistically had no intention of 
agreeing to such an arbitration clause.  However, the argument that an individual’s Seventh 
Amendment rights are violated in cases where a nonsignatory is able to compel another to 
arbitrate pursuant to a misapplication of equitable estoppel carries force because of its 
palpable inequity.  A signatory party in the latter case simply never entered into an 
agreement, and has little capacity, a fortiori, of preventing or anticipating the result. 
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arbitration context that can usurp a plaintiff’s right to jury trial.155  In 
illustration of this aspect, decisions like MS Dealer have established that a 
nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement can unfairly compel arbitration 
under a misapplication of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.156  A plaintiff 
under these circumstances cannot anticipate having to arbitrate with a 
nonsignatory-defendant pursuant to the MS Dealer test because under its 
application of equitable estoppel, the plaintiff’s claims need not evidence 
consent to arbitrate and there is no definite requirement that the plaintiff 
unreasonably rely on any agreement in asserting his claims.  Further, there 
is no requirement that he make a misrepresentation upon which the 
nonsignatory detrimentally relied.  Finally, because no agreement between 
the parties exists, the argument for waiver appears weak.  It seems that, at 
least in some cases, this approach may conceivably deny plaintiffs their 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 
 
 
 155. See supra Section III.A. (explaining how the federal pro-arbitration policy 
sometimes usurps the right to trial by jury). 
 156. See, e.g., Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int'l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008). 
